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CASE NOTES 
Modification of Child Custody Predicated on 
Cohabitation of the Custodial Parent: Jarrett u. 
Jarrett 
State courts in recent years have been forced to decide 
whether the post-divorce moral indiscretions of a custodial par- 
ent justify a change in child custody.l In Jarrett v. Jarrett2 the 
Illinois Supreme Court confronted this question in the context 
of a custodial parent who was openly cohabiting with no plans of 
marriage. In a 5-2 decision, the court upheld the trial court's 
change of custody based upon the cohabitation of the custodial 
parent, despite the absence of tangible evidence that the cohabi- 
tation was adversely affecting the minor children? The court 
also held that the decision did not contravene the constitutional 
bar against conclusive presumptions established by the United 
States Supreme Court in Stanley u. Illinois.' 
Jacqueline Jarrett received a divorce from Walter Jarrett on 
December 6, 1976. By agreement, Jacqueline was awarded cus- 
tody of the three Jarrett children and possession of the family 
home.' Walter was given the right to visit his three daughters, 
ages 12, 10 and 7, at all reasonable times? In April 1977, five 
months after the divorce, Jacqueline informed Walter that she 
planned to have her boyfriend, Wayne Hammon, move into the 
family home with her. Walter protested, but Wayne moved in.? 
Alleging that Jacqueline's cohabitation constituted a change 
of circumstances in the children's environment, Walter filed a 
petition to modify the divorce decree and award him custody of 
1. See Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). 
2. 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 N.E.2d 421 (1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980). 
3. Id. at 345-50, 400 N.E.2d at 423-26. 
4. Id. at 350, 400 N.E.2d at 426; Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
5. 78 Ill. 2d at 340-41, 400 N.E.2d at 421. 
6. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 Ill. App. 3d 932, 933, 382 N.E.2d 12, 14 (1978). 
7. 78 Ill. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 421-22. 
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the children. On July 12, 1977, a modification hearing was held. 
In her testimony, Jacqueline conceded that she and Wayne had 
no plans to marry? She testified that she had explained to the 
children that although some people thought it was wrong for an 
unmarried man and woman to live together, she considered such 
a relationship acceptable as long as the couple loved each other? 
She also indicated that she had told some neighbors that Wayne 
would be moving in with her but had received no adverse com- 
ments. In addition, she noted that the children seemed to have a 
good relationship with Wayne.l0 Walter Jarrett gave testimony 
that the children were always clean, healthy, well dressed, and 
well nourished when he visited them. However, he felt that Jac- 
queline's living arrangement was not a proper one in which to 
raise three young girls. Based upon this evidence, the circuit 
court held that it was "necessary for the moral and spiritual 
well-being and development of the children" to change custody 
to Walter.ll 
With one dissent, the First District Appellate Court of Illi- 
nois reversed.12 The majority held that the relationship between 
Jacqueline and Hammon was not relevant unless it was shown to 
have a negative effect on the childreds Absent evidence of such 
an effect, the court refused to speculate as to what effects the 
cohabitation might have.14 In the appellate court's view, Jacque- 
line's cohabitation alone did not constitute a "change of circurn- 
stances which so detrimentally affected the welfare of the chil- 
dren that it was in their best interests to require a change in 
custody."16 
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and 
reinstated the decision of the circuit court.16 The court held that 
the change of custody, predicated upon the open and continuing 
8. Id. at 342, 400 N.E.2d at 422. 
9. Id. at 341-42, 400 N.E.2d at 422. As to her reasons for not marrying, Jacqueline 
stated that she did not believe that a marriage license made a marriage, that it was too 
soon after her divorce, and that the divorce decree required her to sell the family home 
within six months of remarriage. She explained that the children did not want to move 
and she could not afford to do so. Id. 
10. Id. at 342,400 N.E.2d at 422. Jacqueline testified that Hammon helped the chil- 
dren with their homework, played with them, and verbally disciplined them. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 937-38, 382 N.E.2d at  17. 
13. Id. at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 935-37, 382 N.E.2d at 15-16. 
16. 78 Ill. 2d at 350, 400 N.E.2d at  426, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980). 
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cohabitation of the custodial parent, was not contrary to the 
manifest weight of the evidence, despite the absence of tangible 
evidence of a contemporaneous adverse effect on the minor chil- 
dren.'' The majority rejected Jacqueline's argument that cus- 
tody could not be changed unless the children had suffered "ac- 
tual tangible harm,"18 noting that the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Acta9 (Illinois Marriage Act) requires 
only a finding that a child is seriously endangered to modify cus- 
tody." In the court's view, to wait until a child is actually 
harmed before changing custody "would be to await a demon- 
stration that the very harm which the statute seeks to avoid had 
In examining the dangers which confronted the children, 
the court noted that open and notorious cohabitation is a crimi- 
nal offense in Illinois and that the legislature, in enacting the 
Illinois Marriage Act, had declared that its purpose was to 
strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard 
the The court merged these enactments to form a 
17. Id. at  345-50, 400 N.E.2d at  423-26. 
18. Id. at 348, 400 N.E.2d at 425. 
19. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 59 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The pertinent section of 
the Illinois Marriage Act states: 
610. Modification. 
(a) No motion to modify a custody judgment may be made earlier than 2 
years after its date, unless the court permits it to be made on the basis of 
&davits that there is reason to believe the child's present environment may 
endanger seriously his physical, mental, moral or emotional health. 
(b) The court shall not modify a prior custody judgment unless it finds, 
upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior judgment . . . , that a 
change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and that 
the modification is necessary to serve the best interest of the child. In applying 
these standards the court shall retain the custodian appointed pursuant to the 
prior judgment unless: 
. . . . 
(3) the child's present environment endangers seriously his physical, 
mental, moral or emotional health and the harm likely to be caused by a 
change of environment is outweighed by its advantages to him. 
In applying the new Illinois Marriage Act, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that 
technically the Act was not applicable because the appeal from the custody modification 
was taken before the effective date of the Act. However, after examining prior law and 
the new Act the court concluded that the decision would not be affected by the applica- 
bility or nonapplicability of the Act. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 400 N.E.2d at 423. 
20. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44, 400 N.E.2d a t  423. 
21. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425. 
22. Id. at 345,400 N.E.2d at  423-24. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 Ill. 2d 49,394 N.E.2d 
1204 (1979). 
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moral standard of behavior2s and concluded that it would not be 
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence for the trial 
court to find that the children's moral health was seriously en- 
dangered by their mother's example." 
The court also reasoned that the children's mental and emo- 
tional health could be adversely affected by their mother's con- 
duct. Dangers were seen in the difficulty the children might ex- 
perience in reconciling their own concepts of propriety with 
their mother's conduct and in the potential taunts and jibes the 
children might be forced to endure." 
In addition, the court held that the decision was not at  odds 
with the United States Supreme Court decision of Stanley u. 11- 
linois because the trial court had not presumed that Jacqueline 
was an unfit parent. "Rather the trial court recognized that the 
affection and care of a parent do not alone assure the welfare of 
the child if other conduct of the parent threatens the child's 
moral development. "M 
Chief Justice Goldenhersh and Justice Moran dissented, 
each concurring in the opinion of the other." Chief Justice 
Goldenhersh criticized the decision as making cohabitation per 
se s a c i e n t  grounds for changing custody. In his opinion the re- 
cord showed that the children were healthy and well cared for 
and there was no finding that Jacqueline was unfit. Chief Justice 
Goldenhersh further argued that the courts should leave to the 
theologians the question of the morality of Jacqueline's living 
arrangements, rather than impose the personal standards of the 
judiciary. In his view the majority "based its decision on a nebu- 
lous concept of injury to the children's 'moral well-being and 
development.' 'n8 
In the second dissent, Justice Moran contended that the 
court's decision had violated the Illinois Marriage Act and the 
United States Constitution because the court had conclusively 
presumed that Jacqueline's living arrangements harmed the Jar- 
rett children. He argued that under the Illinois Marriage Act a 
presumption could not make up for the absence of "actual or 
23. 78 Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25. 
24. Id. at 345-50, 400 N.E.2d at 424-26. 
25. Id. at 349-50, 400 N.E.2d at 425-26. 
26. Id. at 350,400 N.E.2d at 426. 
27. Id. at 350, 352, 400 N.E.2d at 426, 427. 
28. Id. at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 426-27 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting). 
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statistical evidence of harm or danger."" Justice Moran asserted 
that instead of changing custody to serve the best interests of 
the children, the change was made to punish Jacqueline for her 
"mis~onduct."~ He also rejected the majority's conclusion that 
the decision did not contravene Stanley v. Illinois. In his view 
the majority used a judicially created conclusive presumption to 
deprive Jacqueline of her children absent evidence that a change 
was in the children's best interest. Since a conclusive presump- 
tion was used to determine custody, the hearing afforded Jac- 
queline amounted to no hearing at all." 
A. Actual Harm and the Best Interests of the Child 
Despite the arguments of the dissenting justices, the Illinois 
Supreme Court's affirmance of the change of custody was consis- 
tent with the Illinois Marriage Act and the constitutional princi- 
ples of Stanley v. Illinois. The court correctly rejected the argu- 
ment that the Illinois Marriage Acts2 requires a showing of 
actual tangible harmss to a child or evidence of an adverse ef- 
fedM before a change of custody is justifiable. Section 610 of the - 
29. Id. at 352, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Moran, J., dissenting). 
30. Id. at 352-53, 400 N.E.2d a t  427. 
31. Id. at 353, 400 N.E.2d at  427. 
32. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40,@ 101-802 (Smith-Hurd 1980). The Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act was adopted from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, 
which was approved by the American Bar Association in 1974. See DESK GUIDE TO THE 
UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 1 (1974). Section 610, which governs modification 
of custody, is identical to 409 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 
33. 78 Ill. 2d at 348,400 N.E.2d at  425. 
34. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 937, 382 N.E.2d at 16. Requiring a showing of "actual harm" 
is, in effect, equivalent to requiring "evidence of a negative effect" because the harm a 
child experiences is the evidence of a negative effect. The terms will be used interchange- 
ably in this Case Note. 
The appellate court's requirement of evidence of a negative effect on the children 
was partially derived from their interpretation of 602 of the Illinois Marriage Act. 64 
Ill. App. 3d at 936-37,382 N.E.2d at 16. Section 602(b) directs that "[tlhe court shall not 
consider conduct of a present or proposed custodian that does not affect his relationship 
to the child." A strict interpretation of this section can lead to the requirement proposed 
by the appellate court. However, such a narrow interpretation is contrary to the primary 
thrust of 602-serving the best interests of the child. Additionally, it would effectually 
rewrite the modification of custody section. Whereas only danger to a child need be 
shown under g 610, the appellate court's reading of 602 would change the 610 re- 
quirement to a showing of an actual adverse effect whenever a parent's conduct is con- 
cerned. Since virtually every custody change is premised on the conduct of the parent, a 
negative effect (i.e., actual harm) would be a prerequisite to nearly every change of cus- 
tody. A more reasonable interpretation of s 602(b) is to view it as a means of focusing 
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Illinois Marriage Act states that the court need only determine 
"if the child's environment endangers seriously his physical, 
mental, moral, or emotional child's environment en- 
dangers him if it exposes him to a risk of "probable harm."s6 
Since the risk of harm usually precedes actual harm, custody 
may be altered absent a showing of "actual harm" under the Illi- 
nois Marriage Act. 
This interpretation is consistent with the guiding principle 
of the Illinois Marriage Act that child custody disputes be re- 
solved so as to serve the best interests of the child? In deter- 
mining whether a change of custody serves this interest, the 
dangers of changing custodys8 must be balanced against the dan- 
gers of failing to change custody.sB 
To require a showing of actual harm as a prerequisite to a 
change of custody would not be in the best interests of children 
because it would significantly increase the number and severity 
of injuries to children arising from failure to change custody.'O 
the court on the best interests of the child rather than punishment of the parent. See 
Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d at 344-45, 400 N.E.2d a t  423. Thus, in cases where the "par- 
ent's behavior has been circumspect or unknown to the child," the parent's conduct 
should seldom be considered unless such behavior appears to negatively affect the child. 
UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 8 402, Comment. However, when a parent's con- 
duct has been open and is known to the child, it should be considered by the court. 
35. 78 Ill. 2d a t  348, 400 N.E.2d at 425 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 40, 5 610 
(1977)). 
36. Definition of "endanger" in WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 
748 (1971). See also definition of "danger" in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (5th ed. 
1979). 
37. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980); 78 Ill. 2d a t  344,400 N.E.2d at 
423 (citing Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill. 408, 415, 105 N.E.2d 300, 304 (1952)). 
The "best interests of the child" standard is used by most courts in the United 
States in child custody adjudications. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judi- 
cial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 236 n.45, 237 
nn.46 & 47 (1975). 
38. Scholars have found that "[alny change in the child's environment may have an 
adverse effect . . . ." UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 409, Comment. See, e.g., 
Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 (1978); Watson, The Children of 
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55 (1969). 
The effect, for example, might be emotional harm to a child from the loss of a parent or 
friends or physical harm resulting from transfer to a home where the child is neglected 
or abused. 
39. The dangers of failing to change custody arise when the present environment 
exposes the child to serious potential harms. See 78 Ill. 2d at 349,400 N.E.2d at 425. See 
also UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 490, Comment (the modification "section is 
designed to maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child) without jeopard- 
izing the child's interest") (emphasis added). 
40. The actual harm requirement minimizes the harms of changing custody because 
fewer custody changes would be made under such a stringent burden of proof. The 
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By its very nature the actual harm requirement mandates that 
before custody is changed, the child must be harmed and evi- 
dence of the harm must be adduced. Such a high burden of 
proof would often preclude a change of custody even when it was 
clear that a child was likely to be harmed. Thus, increased phys- 
ical harm would result in many cases where courts have evidence 
of dangers to physical health, but no evidence of harm? For 
example, a court might have evidence that a paramour is likely 
physically to abuse the child of a custodial parent; yet until the 
child is actually abused, custody could not be changed because 
evidence of actual harm would be lacking." 
The actual harm requirement would make it even more dif- 
ficult to protect against damage to the moral, emotional, and 
mental health of children because evidence of these harms is 
usually more difficult to adduce than evidence of physical 
harm.43 Moral injury will usually not manifest itself until the 
trade-off for this protection, however, is an increase in child injuries arising from failure 
to change custody. 
41. Evidence of physical harm is often not procurable until substantial damage has 
occurred either because the very first harm occurs rapidly and is serious, as where a 
parent beats a child, or because the harm develops slowly and is difficult to detect in the 
early stages. 
42. For an example of a paramour's abuse of children, see Sims v. Sims, 243 Ga. 276, 
253 S.E.2d 763 (1979) (paramour of custodial parent administered corporal punishment 
to the youngest daughter and a serious beating to the oldest son). 
The potential for increased injuries to children probably explains why the vast ma- 
jority of courts change custody absent evidence of actual physical harm. Examination of 
court opinions shows that although custody changes are often premised on potential 
physical harms to children, evidence of actual harm to a child's physical health is rarely 
cited. See generally cases noted in Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). Instead, judges re- 
cite facts suggesting that harm to physical health is probable. Typical statements are 
that the parent leaves the children unattended for long hours, e.g., Mace v. Mace, 9 Or. 
App. 435, 497 P.2d 677 (1972), or provides improper nutritional care, e.g., L.H.Y. v. 
J.M.Y., 535 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). 
43. Evidence of moral harm to children is difficult to adduce because the harm is 
usually subjective and occurs within the mind. See Jarrett v. Jarrett, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 
939, 382 N.E.2d at 18 (McNamara, J., dissenting) ("It might be not only difIicult but 
impossible to present evidence showing objective effects that such conduct would have 
on minor children. The effects may well be subjective ones that will raise their ugly 
heads and make their presence known at some future time.") (quoting Gehn v. Gehn, 51 
Ill. App. 3d 946, 949, 367 N.E.2d 508, 511 (1977)). Harms that originate in the mind are 
particularly hard to detect in children because children often have difficulty expressing 
themselves. As several psychiatrists and psychologists have testified, "[elven when they 
have no fear of expressing their feelings, children will often be able to articulate them 
only in the vaguest ways, if at all." Litwach, Gerber & Fenster, The Proper Role of Psy- 
chology in Child Custody Disputes, 18 J. FAM. L. 269,288 (1979-80) [hereinafter cited as 
The Proper Role of Psychology]. 
Perhaps the best evidence that moral harm can rarely be shown in children is found 
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child has matured.44 By that time, however, the child's moral 
values are well formed:' and the evidence of moral injury is evi- 
dence of the very harms sought to be avoided-immoral conduct 
and its consequences? Exposing a child to an immoral environ- 
ment can also result in emotional and mental harm?' These 
harms, like moral harm, can be difficult to prove because the 
harms are usually within the mind. Under the actual harm re- 
quirement, although a child was injured, custody would not be 
changed in many cases either because the parent or professional 
could not prove its existence48 or, even if proven, could not es- 
. by examining court opinions. Examination of fifty court opinions in which custodial par- 
ents had engaged in immoral conduct disclosed only one case in which a court found 
evidence of actual injury to a child's moral health-Repetti v. Repetti, 1 FAM. L. REP. 
2739 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (judge changed custody after speaking with the older chil- 
dren-ages 16, 15 and 13, because he was convinced that "their moral concepts lwere] 
already being distorted by" their father's cohabitation). Even in that case, however, the 
evidence was apparently not sufficient to prevent a reversal of the custodial arrangement 
on appeal. Repetti v. Repetti, 377 N.Y.S.2d 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975). See also cases 
noted in Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980) for additional examples of the absence of moral 
harm. 
Although evidence of moral harm can rarely be shown, numerous courts have never- 
theless recognized that moral harm can result from a parent's immoral conduct and have 
therefore changed custody. See generally Annot., 100 A.L.R.3d 625 (1980). Courts will 
typically justify the change on the grounds that the child was aware of the parent's sev- 
eral acts of adultery, the child was continually exposed to cohabitation, or the parent 
allowed the child to witness actual sexual activity. See id. Such showings are evidence of 
potential harm to a child's moral health, not actual harm. If actual harm were required, 
custodial parents could subject children to immorality of all types, ranging from pornog- 
raphy to actual observance of sexual activity; yet since evidence of an adverse effect 
could rarely be shown, the court would be barred from taking protective action. For 
examples of cases in which children were allowed to observe sexual activity and custody 
was changed absent evidence of an adverse effect, see Jones v. Jones, 175 N.W.2d 389 
(Iowa 1970), and Derringer v. Derringer, 377 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964). 
44. See 78 Ill. 2d at  349, 400 N.E.2d at  425. See also The Proper Role of Psychol- 
ogy, supra note 43, at  291 n.39. 
45. Dr. Benjamin Spock has written of children from ages 6 to 11 that "[tlhe ideas 
of right and wrong that their parents taught them have not been forgotten. In fact, they 
have sunk in so deep that they now think of them as their [own] ideas." B. SPOCK, BABY 
AND CHILD CARE 431 (4th ed. 1976). 
46. Some of the harms resulting from immoral conduct that are prevalent in today's 
society are venereal diseases, broken homes, unwanted children, and abortions. 
47. An immoral environment can emotionally upset a child who disdains the par- 
ent's conduct or partner. See Moore v. Smith, 255 Ark. 249, 499 S.W.2d 634 (1973). 
Mental and emotional harms may also arise from teasing by other children, 78 Ill. 2d a t  
349-50,400 N.E.2d at 425-26, or difficulty in studying due to the conduct, In re Jane B., 
85 Misc. 2d 515, 517-521, 380 N.Y.S.2d 848, 851-54 (Sup. Ct. 1976). 
48. Psychologists and psychiatrists can assist in proving that a child has been emo- 
tionally or mentally harmed. Legal writers, however, have questioned the reliability of 
psychologists' and psychiatrists' opinions in the courtroom. See J. ZISKIN, COPING WITH 
PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY (2d ed. 1975); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry 
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tablish that it stems from the immoral environment? 
It must be conceded that allowing a change of custody ab- 
sent evidence of an adverse effect on the child entails the risk of 
an increase in injuries to children arising from changes of cus- 
tody. The lower burden of proof creates this risk by allowing 
more custody modifications to be made. The drafters of the Uni- 
form Marriage and Divorce Act, which was adopted by Illinois in 
the Illinois Marriage Act, recognized this. Their solution was to 
require that the child's present environment endanger seriously 
his physical, mental, moral, or emotional health." A mere show- 
ing that it is in the general interest of a child to change custody 
will not suffice;s1 serious danger is required. As an additional 
protection from unnecessary changes, the Act requires that "the 
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment . . . [be] 
outweighed by its  advantage^."^^ Unlike the actual harm re- 
quirement, the Act does not require that children experience the 
harms of failing to change custody. Thus, the modification sec- 
tion successfully maximizes the finality of the divorce decree, 
thereby assuring continuity for the child, without jeopardizing 
the child's interesP 
Allowing modification when a child is endangered presents 
additional risks. By acting upon evidence of danger, a judge is 
allowed to base custody changes on predictions and presump- 
tions of harm.64 This creates a risk that the conduct of a custo- 
dial parent may be "labelled" as seriously endangering the child 
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 
693 (1974). One commentator has even argued that in the child custody context the psy- 
chological and psychiatric professions have nothing meaningful to add to the decision- 
making process. See Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1117 (1976). But see The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, 
at 269. 
49. See Lauerman, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U .  CIN. L. 
REV. 647, 662 n.109 (1977). 
50. UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409. 
51. See UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409, Comment. 
52. UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 409. Although neither the appellate 
court nor the Illinois Supreme Court opinions gave more than summary treatment to 
this requirement, presumably it was considered in the decision-making process. 
A third protection from unnecessary custody changes is also afforded children 
through the Uniform Act's refusal to allow a motion to modify a custody decree within 
two years of its date unless an affidavit shows that the child is seriously endangered. 
UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 409(a). 
53. UNIFORM ARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT 5 409, Comment. 
54. When a judge acts upon evidence of danger, the judge is generally acting on an 
inference or presumption that harm will exist in the future or that it presently exists, 
but is undetected. 
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to disguise personal biasesss or that a presumption or prediction 
will be erroneous.s6 Although such results may not be in the 
child's best interestss7 and may serve to penalize a parentP8 the 
solution is not to preclude judges from issuing decrees based on 
potential harm. Rather, the solution is to allow judicial review of 
the decreem and to provide judges with legislative guidelines of 
what constitutes immoral conduct60 and when it may be consid- 
ered..' Judges can then use a legislative standard of moral be- 
havior rather than a personal one.6a This would reduce the risk 
of improper custody changes without jeopardizing the child's in- 
55. See Lauerman, supra note 49, at 670-72. 
56. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 49-52 (1973) [hereinafter cited as BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS] (predictions may 
be erroneous because "[nlo one-and psychoanalysis creates no exception-can forecast 
just what experiences, what events, what changes a child or for that matter his adult 
custodian, will actually encounter") (footnote omitted). 
57. Id. at 51-52. 
58. See Lauerman, supra note 49, at 670-72. It should be noted, however, that the 
actual harm requirement would also fail to prevent some custody changes made to pun- 
ish a parent since a judge is free to define or "label" actual harm as he sees fit. Further- 
more, the "penalty" a parent receives is usually less severe in a child custody adjudica- 
tion than other parent-child actions such as neglect or adoption. Whereas in a neglect 
proceeding a complete severance of parent-child relations often results, in a child cus- 
tody modification after divorce a parent moves from the status of a custodial parent to a 
noncustodial parent with visitation privileges and other rights. 
59. Illinois courts are allowed to review divorce decrees and reverse the trial courts' 
decisions if discretion was exercised in a manner contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence. 64 Ill. App. 3d at  935, 382 N.E.2d at 15. 
60. The Illinois legislature has provided its courts with relevant moral standards. 78 
Ill. 2d at 346, 400 N.E.2d at 425. ("The fornication statute and the Illinois Marriage and 
Dissolution of Marriage Act evidence the relevant moral standards of this State as de- 
clared by our legislature."). 
61. In order to assure that custody decisions are made to serve the best interests of 
the child, the Illinois Marriage Act places some constraints on the use of evidence per- 
taining to the conduct of a custodial parent. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 402 (Smith-Hurd 
1980). The statute reads, "[tlhe court shall not consider conduct of a present or proposed 
custodian that does not affect his relationship to the child." Id. Illinois case law further 
assures that custody changes are motivated by the child's interests by restricting the use 
of evidence of past immoral conduct where "the parent's present conduct establishes the 
improbability of such lapses in the future." 78 Ill. 2d at  347, 400 N.E.2d at 424. Cf. 
Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HAW. L. REV. 1156, 
1318 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (to help assure a child-centered focus in 
neglect proceedings, past parental behavior should be relevant only insofar as it indicates 
a likelihood of further harms to the child in the future). 
62. If legislative guidelines are provided, as they were in Jarrett, then the courts 
need "not impose the personal preferences and standards of the judiciary" in deciding a 
case. 78 Ill. 2d at 351, 400 N.E.2d at 427 (Goldenhersh, C.J., dissenting). A question not 
discussed in this Case Note is the degree to which a state may constitutionally regulate 
moral conduct through its police power. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1202-13. 
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terest? Finally, in considering these risks, it should be recog- 
nized that predictions and presumptions are not foreign to 
judges in child custody adjudications. Judges, for example, must 
"predict" which parent will offer the best environment to the 
child in making the initial divorce decree? If judges are compe- 
tent to make predictions of the future before seeing the post- 
divorce environment each parent will offer, then they should be 
still more competent after observing them. 
B. Dangers to the Children's Health 
Under the serious danger requirement, the trial court could 
properly find that Jacqueline's cohabitation seriously endan- 
gered the moral health of the Jarrett children? Centuries of 
human experience have taught "that a child learns by example, 
especially from his  parent^."^^ Recent scientific research has 
confirmed that a primary role model, such as a parent or cohab- 
iting paramour, has a profound effect on a child's moral values.67 
63. Apparently, no legal commentators have advocated a requirement of evidence of 
actual harm or an adverse effect to change custody. However, some commentators have 
suggested as a solution to biased or erroneous custody changes that only short term pre- 
dictions be allowed. They argue that since the future is difficult to predict, it is in the 
interest of the child not to allow predictions of harm in the distant future. See BEYOND 
THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 56, at 52; Lauerman, supra note 49, at 672-79. This 
approach, however, fails to recognize that some harms in children develop gradually and 
do not manifest themselves until the child has matured. See The Proper Role of Psy- 
chology, supra note 43, at 291 n.39. The focus should be on the probability of harm and 
its gravity. Whether a harm will occur sooner or later should be a component of 
probability, not its substitute. 
64. See BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 56, at 51 ("Each child placement 
. . . is based upon assumptions and predictions about children and adults who are desig- 
nated parents"); The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 282 (as long as the 
best interest standard is used, "some predictions must be made in custody cases"). 
65. 78 Ill. 2d at 345-49, 400 N.E.2d at  424-25. 
66. Brown v. Brown, 218 Va. 196, 199, 237 S.E.2d 89, 91 (1977) (quoting Beck v. 
Beck, 341 So.2d 580, 582 (La. Ct. App. 1977)). 
67. One study showed that children's moral judgment "responses are readily modifi- 
able particularly through the utilization of adult modeling cues." Bandura & McDonald, 
Influence of Social Reinforcement and the Behavior of Models in Shaping Children's 
Moral Judgments, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 274,280 (1963). Another study found 
that "[tlhe most clear-cut conclusion to emerge from our analysis of the experimental 
findings on imitative modeling is that the direct observation of a model who yields to 
temptation and deviates from a social norm or prohibition has a disinhibiting effect on 
the observer." Hoffman, Moral Development, in 2 CARMICHAEL'S MANUAL OF CHILD PSY- 
CHOLOGY 316 (P. Mussen ed. 1970). This study and others were cited in Walter Jarrett's 
brief. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 20-22, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 111.2d 337,400 N.E.2d 
421 (1979). 
Despite the findings of such studies, at  least one body of writers has concluded that 
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Moreover, the Jarrett children were taught to engage in immoral 
conduct not only by example, but by precept as well through 
Jacqueline's explanation to them that she considered her rela- 
tionship acceptable." The children's continual exposure to such 
teachings justified the court's conclusion that there was a high 
probability that the children would adopt moral standards that 
conflicted with the standard of moral conduct established by the 
criminal code and the Illinois Marriage Act. 
In addition to moral injury, potential harms to emotional 
and mental health were mentioned by the courtPB Jacqueline's 
failure to accept the obligations of marriage or assure the court 
that she intended to marry in the near future increased the like- 
lihood of a second "breakup" of the children's primary role mod- 
els and consequent emotional harm. The children might have 
felt insecure as they perceived that the relationship was tempo- 
rary. Further adverse effects would be likely as the children at- 
tempted to reconcile their mother's teachings on morality with 
those of their father, their religion, and society.70 Ridicule from 
"[tlhere is little evidence that many 'immoral' practices affect children in any way.'' See 
Developments, supra note 61, at 1320. In light of the research that has been conducted 
on child development and moral values, it is difficult to be sure of the meaning of such a 
statement. Research for this Case Note disclosed no court opinion espousing such a 
broad view. But cf. Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329, 331 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) ("Nothing in the record or in logic supports a conclusion that 
divorced parents who fornicate, for that reason alone, . . . adversely affect the well-be- 
ing and development of their children . . . over and above whatever adverse effect sepa- 
ration and divorce may already have had on the children."). I t  may be, however, that 
those who feel there is little evidence are referring to the lack of long term studies actu- 
ally conducted in the home on the effects of immoral conduct on children. If this is the 
meaning of the statement, then the commentators are apparently correct. In the child 
custody area, for example, such specific research is nonexistent, and according to some of 
those who would conduct the research-psychologists and psychiatrisbit may never be 
forthcoming because of ethical considerations and the impracticalities of obtaining a 
meaningful result. See The Proper Role of Psychology, supra note 43, at 277-79. Conse- 
quently, there is little evidence from long term studies in the home that immoral conduct 
does affect children, or that it does not. There is, however, extensive evidence from short 
term studies clearly establishing that the conduct of a parent or role model significantly 
affects a child's moral values and behavior. See, e.g., Grusec, Kuczynski, Rushton & 
Sirnutis, Learning Resistance to Temptation through Observation, 15 DEVELOPI&NTAL 
PSYCH. 233 (1979); Lubitz & Johnson, Parental Manipulation of the Behavior of Normal 
and Deviant Children, 46 CHILD DEV. 719 (1975). For reference to additional studies on 
the influence of a primary role model on the moral development of children, see ChiM 
Development Abstracts & Bibliography. 
68. 64 Ill. App. 3d at 934, 382 N.E.2d at  14. 
69. 78 Ill. 2d at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 425-26. 
70. Id. at 349, 400 N.E.2d at 426. 
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others was also a possible harme71 
Although experience and research have shown these to be 
some of the dangers to children, scientific researchers have cau- 
tioned that there is much about cohabitation and its effects that 
is still unkn~wn.~Vhus, when a court is faced with one parent 
offering a proven safe environment and the other is offering an 
environment with serious known and unknown risks and indicat- 
ing no desire to safeguard the children through marriage, a 
transfer of custody is in the best interests of the children.lS In 
these circumstances, the Illinois Supreme Court properly held 
that the trial court's decision was not contrary to the manifest 
weight of the evidence. 
C. Stanley v. Illinois 
The change of custody due to Jacqueline's cohabitation waa 
not only in the best interests of the children but also consistent 
with the holding of Stanley v. Illin~is.~' In Stanley, the United 
States Supreme Court held unconstitutional an Illinois statute 
which created a conclusive presumption that an unwed father is 
unfit to have custody of his children." The Court concluded that 
depriving an unwed father of all parental rights in his illegiti- 
mate children without a prior hearing to determine his actual 
unfitness, when the state affords that protection to unwed 
mothers and married parents, violates the due process76 and 
equal protection77 clauses of the fourteenth amendment. 
The Jarrett decision is not at odds with Stanley because of 
several fundamental differences between the cases. First, proce- 
dural due process was afforded in Jarrett because, unlike Stan- 
ley, a meaningful hearing was held without the use of a conclu- 
sive presumption. In Stanley, the unwed father lost all rights in 
71. Id. 
72. See Hudson & Heme, A Note on Cohabitation, 22 FAM. COORDINATOR 495 
(1973). 
73. See Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of 
Indeterminacy, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 261 (1975). Cf., In re J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 
486, 498, 324 A.2d 90, 97 (1974) (since homosexuality is not fully understood, the court 
should be hesitant to allow unnecessary exposure of a child to an environment which 
may be deleterious). 
74. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
75. Id. at 647-49. 
76. Id. at 658. Five of the seven participating justices joined in holding that the 
failure to have a hearing was a violation of the due process clause. 
77. Id. Four of the seven justices concluded that Stanley was denied equal protec- 
tion of the laws. 
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his children with no hearing whatsoever; a conclusive presump- 
tion served in its place.78 In Jarrett, however, a full modification 
hearing was held.?@ At the hearing, Walter carried the initial 
burden of proof and successfully established that Jacqueline was 
engaged in open and continuing ~ohabitation.~~ If some lesser 
showing had been made, such as past acts of adultery, fornica- 
tion, or cohabitation, then custody would not have been changed 
because the "past moral indiscretions of a parent are not sufii- 
cient ground for denying custody if the parent's present conduct 
establishes the improbability of such lapses in the future? 
Once open and continuing cohabitation was shown, the court 
then presumed that the children's moral and emotional health 
was endangered? Unlike the presumption in Stanley, however, 
the presumption in Jarrett is not con~lusive.~ It may be rebut- 
ted under Illinois law by showing that the child is unaware of 
the parent's conductw or that the conduct is only temporary? 
78. Id. at 649, 655-56. 
79. 78 Ill. 2d at 341, 400 N.E.2d at 422. 
80. The Jarrett opinion did not expressly make reference to the "burden of proof." 
That the burden is initially on the -noncustodial parent is established in the opinion 
generally, in other Illinois court decisions, e.g., King v. Vancil, 34 Ill. App. 3d 831, 836, 
341 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1975), and in 8 610 of the Illinois Marriage Act. Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 
40, $ 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical Practice Notes). 
81. 78 Ill. 2d at 347, 400 N.E.2d at 424-25. 
82. Id. at 347-48, 400 N.E.2d at 425. Although the court did not designate this as a 
presumption, counsel for Walter Jarrett conceded that a presumption of danger was in- 
volved. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 19, 22, 24, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 78 Ill. 2d 337, 400 
N.E.2d 421 (1979). The presumption arises from the fact that danger is a prediction or 
presumption of potential harm. 
83. Contra, Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). For a criticism of Justice Brennan's dissent, see Golden, Should a 
Divorced Mother Lose Custody Because She Has a Lover?, 3 F a .  ADVOCATE 19 (1981). 
Even if the presumption were irrebutable, there is substantial authority suggesting 
that the irrebutable presumption analysis is dead and has been replaced by an equal 
protection analysis. See, e.g., J. Nowm, R. R W ~ A  & J. Yomc, HANDBOOK ON CONSTI- 
TUTIONAL LAW 497-98 (1978); G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 969-71 (10th ed. 1980). The approach may yet survive, however, where there are 
independent reasons for heightened scrutiny, as when a fundamental interest is affected. 
Id. at 971 n.6. It may be that no fundamental interest or other reason for heightened 
scrutiny is involved in Jarrett. See note 104 infra. 
84. In re Custody of Boyer, 83 Ill. App. 3d 52,403 N.E.2d 796 (1980) (child was too 
young to be aware of mother's cohabitation). 
85. A cohabiting custodial parent may show that his conduct is only temporary and 
thus prevent a change of custody by assuring the court that he plans to marry or that the 
illicit relationship has ceased. Rippon v. Rippon, 64 Ill. App. 3d 465, 381 N.E.2d 70 
(1978) (mother cohabited after divorce but assured the court she would marry when her 
second divorce became final); Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 49 Ill. App. 3d 160, 364 
N.E.2d 566 (1977) (cohabiting couple separated before hearing and planned to marry 
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Custody will not be changed under these circumstances since the 
child's exposure to immorality is minimal and a change of cus- 
tody would be contrary to the interests of the child.86 
Even if the presumption is not rebutted, a custodial parent 
may still retain custody by showing that, despite the danger, a 
change of custody is not in the child's best interest. Such a 
showing is permissible because the presumption of danger in 
Jarrett, unlike the presumption of unfitness in Stanley, does not 
mean that custody should be ~hanged.~' Instead, the presump- 
tion of danger is only one factor to consider in determining what 
is in the best interests of the child. Under Illinois law, even if 
danger is presumed, the court must still determine whether "the 
harm likely to be caused by a change of environment is out- 
weighed by the advantages to [the child]."88 Focusing on the 
likely harms of a change, a custodial parent may retain custody 
by showing that, despite the danger, the present environment is 
more acceptable than the environment offered by the noncus- 
todial parent:@ or that harm will likely result if the child is torn 
from his present home? These procedural safeguards assure 
that a change of custody is made to serve the best interests of 
the child rather than to punish the parent. Since Jacqueline 
made none of these defensive showings, custody was changed af- 
ter a full hearing. 
afterwards). 
86. See 78 Ill. 2d at 347,400 N.E.2d at 424. 
87. Id. at  347, 400 N.E.2d at 424-26. 
Chief Justice Goldenhersh expressed concern that custody was changed even though 
Jacqueline was not found unfit. Id. a t  351, 400 N.E.2d at 426-27 (Goldenhersh, C.J., 
dissenting). The Illinois Marriage Act, however, has no requirement of unfitness. ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980). Prior to the Act, a finding of unfitness was 
not mandatory. Custody could be changed if evidence established that the custodial par- 
ent was unfit or that a change of conditions made a change of custody in the best inter- 
ests of the children. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264, 292 N.E.2d 145, 
148 (1972). 
88. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 5 610(b)(3) (Smith-Hurd 1980). 
89. See Burris v. Burris, 70 Ill. App. 3d 503, 388 N.E.2d 811 (1979) (cohabiting 
mother retained custody of children under Illinois Marriage Act where the father had 
contracted a potentially permanent blinding disease, his income had been reduced as a 
result, and his home would be more crowded than the mother's). Although this case 
serves as an example, it was questioned by the Jarrett court. 78 Ill. 2d at  348,400 N.E.2d 
at 425. 
90. For an example of the effective use of a showing that a child will likely be 
harmed by a change of custody where immoral conduct was not involved, see Cebrzynski 
v. Cebnynski, 68 Ill. App. 3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1978) (stepmother retained custody 
after testimony was given that children's emotional health would be damaged if custody 
was changed to natural mother). 
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A second important distinction between Jarrett and Stan- 
ley is found in the allocation and nature of the constitutional 
interests of the parties involved. The Supreme Court has "firmly 
established that 'what procedures due process may require 
under any given set of circumstances must begin with a determi- 
nation of the precise nature of the government function involved 
as well as of the private interest that has been affected by gov- 
ernmental action.'"@l Once ascertained, these interests are 
weighed against one anothere2 with consideration given to the 
rationality of the connection between the governmental means 
and end, the existence of alternative means for effectuating the 
end, and the extent to which the private interest is affected? 
In Stanley the private interest in the dependency proceed- 
ing was primarily the "essential" right of a parent to raise his 
child." The state intruded on this interest in its role as parens 
patriae to protect the interests of the child? Although the 
state's end of protecting children was "legitimate" and "well 
within the power of the State to implement,"w the Court held 
that the state's means "spited" its own end in many cases by 
separating children from fit fathers.@' Thus, the scheme violated 
the due process clause because it deprived a parent of his child 
without reference to the very factor that the state itself deemed 
fundamental to its statutory scheme-parental fitness." The de- 
nial of due process was compounded by the fact that the private 
interest involved was dramatically infringed through a severing 
of all parental rights in the child. The Stanley Court also noted 
that alternative means were readily available to accomplish the 
state's objective by holding a hearing to determine fitness.@@ 
The allocation of interests in Jarrett is fundamentally dif- 
ferent from the allocation in Stanley. Jarrett was a child cus- 
tody proceeding resulting from divorce. In such a proceeding the 
custodial parent's rights are countered by the state's obligation 
91. Stanley v..Illinois, 405 U.S. at 650-51 (1971) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v. Mc- 
Elroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 (1961)). 
92. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1194-95. 
93. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See Stan- 
ley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 649-55; Developments, supra note 61, at 1194-95. 
94. 405 U.S. at 651-52. 
95. Id. at 652. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 652-53. 
98. Id. at 653. 
99. Id. at 657 n.9. 
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to protect the interests of the child as parens patriae.loO Unlike 
Stanley, however, a second "countervailing interest"lol conflicts 
with the interest of the custodial parent-the right of the non- 
custodial parent to custody of the child.lo2 As a result of this 
conflict, the state is "thrust into the role of mediator by neces- 
sity."lo3 In such a proceeding it is likely that the combined coun- 
tervailing interests of the state and the noncustodial parent as- 
sure that the court can act in the best interests of the child by 
not requiring evidence of actual harm to change custody. Re- 
quiring evidence of danger, such as open and continuing cohabi- 
tation, would adequately protect the custodial parent's 
interests.lOI 
100. See R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 476 (1978); Developments, supra 
note 61, at 1326. 
101. 405 U.S. at 651. 
102. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1314. In a case similar to Stanley, but 
with more substantial countervailing interests, the Supreme Court approved an unwed 
father's complete loss of his child through adoption. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 
246 (1978). 
103. See Developments, supra note 61, at 1326. The fact that a citizen initiated the 
court action in Jarrett rather than the state raises the question of whether there was 
sufficient state action to invoke the protections of the fourteenth amendment. See Lau- 
erman, supra note 49, at 712 & 682 n.203. 
104. The result of the conflict of rights between a custodial parent and a noncus- 
todial parent in a child custody dispute and the degree to which these rights can be 
limited in favor of the child's rights has not been specifically determined by the Supreme 
Court. See Comment, Child Custody Revisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution 
of Marriage Act, 56 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 671, 675 (1980); Developments, supra note 61, at  
1328. However, the Court has held that in an adoption proceeding an unwed father's 
interests may be adequately protected by a standard which focuses on the best interests 
of the child. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,254 (1978). Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court has never held,that an actual showing of adverse effect on a child was necessary 
for the state to interfere with the constitutional rights of a parent. On the contrary, the 
Court has repeatedly recognized that "harm" to a child's health "may be properly in- 
ferred," Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 230 (1972), and that when "possible harms" or 
"dangers" to children are present, parental rights may be curtailed. Prince v. Massachu- 
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 168-70 (1944). See Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (when 
child's physical or mental health is jeopardized, a state is not without constitutional con- 
trol over parental discretion in dealing with children). 
State courts dealing with constitutional rights in custody disputes have generally 
concluded that both parents possess equal rights to custody. See, eg., Mayer v. Mayer, 
150 N.J. Super. 556, 564, 376 A.2d 214, 218-19 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1977). Nevertheless, 
state courts have generally held that parental rights must yield to the best interests of 
the child, particularly when the child's welfare is jeopardized. See, e.g., In re J.S. & C., 
129 N.J. Super. 486, 493, 324 A.2d 90, 95 (Super. C t  Ch. Div. 1974). The Illinois courts 
seem to have adopted this view. See, e.g., Soldner v. Soldner, 69 Ill. App. 3d 97, 101,386 
N.E.2d 1153, 1157 (1979) ("the parent's natural rights must give way to the welfare and 
best interest of the child"). This approach finds support among legal theoreticians. See 
BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 56, at  7, 105-11. 
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Further support for the constitutionality of the procedure 
followed in Jarrett lies in the rationality of the connection be- 
tween the state's means and end. In Stanley, the Court noted 
that the state's end of protecting children was "well within the 
power of the State to implement."lo6 The only objection to the 
state's action was the failure of the state's means rationally to 
serve its end.lo6 The procedure in Jarrett has no such flaw. It is 
clear that Illinois' end in child custody adjudications is to serve 
the best interests of the child.lo7 The state successfully achieves 
this objective through a means which is carefully "designed to 
maximize finality (and thus assure continuity for the child) 
without jeopardizing the child's interest."lo8 An integral part of 
the procedure is the use of reasonable predictions or presump- 
tions of probable harm,lO, such as the presumption that contin- 
ual exposure to open cohabitation will probably harm a child.l1° 
The only alternative to presumptions is to require evidence of 
actual harm, which would result in increased injuries to children. 
Such an outcome, far from achieving the state's end of protect- 
Another potential distinction between Jarrett and Stanley lies in the nature of the 
parent's interests. Because of the conflict between the parents' rights in Jarrett, follow- 
ing the dissolution of the family, the interests of the parents are probably weakened. See 
Developments, supra note 61, at 1314. See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 75 (1976) (when minor child's desire of abortion conflicts with parent, family 
unit fractured, so interest in safeguarding parental authority and family unit is dimin- 
ished). The result is that the right of a parent to custody of his child is probably of less 
magnitude than the more permanent right of a parent to raise his child, where the par- 
ent has not subjected himself to the custodial powers of the court by divorce and a dis- 
pute over custody. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 648-49. This result seems 
less significant under the balancing test of due process, however, because each parent's 
interest in custody appears to be offset by the other parent's interest. The lesser nature 
of a parent's right to custody may be more relevant under an equal protection analysis 
rather than due process since strict scrutiny would not be applied if the parent's right 
was not a fundamental interest. Here again, however, a balancing approach would proba- 
bly be employed (see Developments, supra note 61, at 1197) which would make the dis- 
tinction of less importance. 
105. 405 US. at 652. 
106. Id. at 652-53. 
107. 78 Ill. 2d at 343-44,400 N.E.2d at 422-23; Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, $5 602 & 610 
(Smith-Hurd 1980). 
108. Iu. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, 5 610 (Smith-Hurd 1980) (Historical and Practice 
Notes) (quoting Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act 5 409, Commissioners' Note). 
109. Cf. Developments, supra note 61, a t  1318 (child-centered neglect proceedings 
to be constitutional should only be oriented to prediction of the future condition of the 
child). 
110. But see Jarrett v. Jarrett, 101 S. Ct. 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari) (there is no rational correlation between divorced parents who forni- 
cate and divorced parents who impair the healthy development of their children). 
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ing children, would assure its failure in many cases. 
As a final due process consideration, the Supreme Court has 
required an evaluation of the extent to which the state action 
burdens the private interest.ll1 Because the father in Stanley 
had failed to marry the mother of his children before she died, 
the state completely severed his parental rights.l12 No action by 
the father could prevent the result even though the illicit rela- 
tionship had ceased."' Such a heavy burden on parental rights 
is not found in Jarrett. As a custodial parent, Jacqueline had 
the opportunity to prevent the loss of her children by accepting 
the obligations of marriage or ending the relationship. Further- 
more, even though custody was changed, it did not work a com- 
plete severence of her parental rights, but only a change from 
the status of custodial parent to noncustodial parent. Some pa- 
rental rights, such as visitation or the right to custody should 
the circumstances of the other parent change, were retained?' 
111. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also 
405 U.S. at 649-50. 
112. 405 U.S. at 646. 
113. Stanley could possibly have regained custody of his children through guardian- 
ship or adoption proceedings. The attempt would likely have been futile, however, and 
he would have been seriously prejudiced by court restrictions. 405 U.S. at 647-49. More- 
over, the Supreme Court has never "embraced the general proposition that a wrong may 
be done if it can be undone." Id. at 647. 
114. Jacqueline retained her visitation privileges with the children. 64 Ill. App. 3d at  
938, 382 N.E.2d at 17 (1978) (Simon, J., concurring). 
Although the core of the Stanley decision was due process, a paragraph of the opin- 
ion was devoted to equal protection. See 405 U.S. at  658. The Court held that the state's 
failure to afford a hearing to Stanley on his parental qualifications while extending it to 
married and divorced parents and to unmarried mothers was a deprivation of equal pro- 
tection of the laws. Id. Considerable confusion has surrounded this holding because the 
majority did not specify the branch of equal protection employed. See Note, Stanley u. 
Illinois: Expanding the Rights of the Unwed Father, 34 U. Pm. L. REV. 303,311 (1972). 
Apparently the court was reluctant to deal with equal protection at all. See Note, The 
Impact of Stanley v. Illinois on Custody Proceedings for Illegitimate Children: Procedu- 
ral Parity for the Putative Father?, 3 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 31, 36 (1973). This 
makes analysis of Jarrett on equal protection grounds somewhat speculative. Neverthe- 
less, it appears most likely that the majorty in Stanley used the traditional equal protec- 
tion analysis. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process and Equal Protec- 
tion-Classifications based on Illegitimacy, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 908, 911. Under this 
analysis, the gender and illegitimacy classification in Stanley was not rationally related 
to a legitimate state interest because it "spited" the state's interest. See 405 U.S. at  652- 
53. Application of the rational basis analysis to Jarrett would likely produce a contrary 
result. The narrow Jarrett classification, consisting of parents who openly cohabit with 
no assurance of marriage, was neatly tailored to protect children by including only custo- 
dial parents who expose their children to continuing immoral conduct. See 78 Ill. 2d at  
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The Illinois Supreme Court's affirmance of the change of 
custody in Jarrett u. Jarrett was consistent with the Illinois 
Marriage Act. Guided by the children's interest, the court's pri- 
mary concern was not with how Jacqueline chose to conduct her 
personal life, but with the effects of that conduct on the children 
she had been entrusted with by the court. The decision to allow 
modification when the children were endangered, rather than to 
await evidence of actual harm, served the best interests of the 
children and is consistent with Stanley v. Illinois. 
Fred D. Essig 
347, 400 N.E.2d at 424; Developments, supra note 61, at 1344. Such a classification, 
being only the first step in a finely-tuned procedure to protect the interests of children, 
seems consistent with the equal protection clause. 
